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ABSTRACT
In recent work, Atran, Henrich, Norenzayan and colleagues developed an
account of religion that reconciles insights from the “by-product”
accounts and the adaptive accounts. According to their synthesis, the
process of cultural group selection driven by group competition has
recruited our proclivity to adopt and spread religious beliefs and engage
in religious practices to increase within group solidarity, harmony, and
cooperation. While their account has much merit, I believe it only tells
us half the story of how institutional religions have evolved. Their
cultural evolutionary account of religion only looks at the cultural
dynamics arising from competition between groups, not at the
dynamics arising from within the group. Drawing from game-theoretic
analyses of the emergence and cultural evolution of social institutions, I
outline two sets of important “within-group” dynamics that shape
institutional religions. The ﬁrst follow from the necessity to keep the
interaction of the participants in an equilibrium state in order to
maintain the social institution. The second arise from the competition of
institutional features for traction within the group. Bringing these
dynamics into account enables us to explain prominent features of
institutional religions that cannot be satisfactorily explained by the
current model of the cultural evolution of religions.
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1. Introduction
In recent work, a number of inﬂuential authors in the study of religion—most notably Atran and
Henrich (2010), Norenzayan (2013), and Norenzayan et al. (2016)—have argued that the process
of cultural group selection has recruited our proclivity to adopt and spread religious beliefs as
well as psychological mechanisms strengthening our commitment to these beliefs (such as costly
devotions) in order to increase within group solidarity, harmony and cooperation. This process
was driven by group competition. In their own words:
cultural evolutionary processes, driven by competition among groups, have exploited aspects of our evolved
psychology […] to gradually assemble packages of supernatural beliefs, devotions, and rituals that were increas-
ingly eﬀective at instilling deep commitment, galvanizing internal solidarity, and sustaining larger-scale
cooperation. (Atran & Henrich, 2010, p. 19)
Their account has much merit. It combines the best of both the so-called by-product and adaptive
hypotheses without succumbing to their respective weaknesses. Atran and Henrich (2010), Noren-
zayan (2013), and Norenzayan et al. (2016) side with advocates of the by-product hypothesis in
explaining the emergence of religious beliefs in terms of cognitive predispositions such as the over-
extension of agency (Barrett, 2000; Guthrie, 1993) and the ease with which minimally
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counterintuitive representations—such as representations of ethereal ghosts and gods—spread
(Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2004; Boyer, 2001). They do not however turn a blind eye to what Durkheim
(1995) has called the “secular utility” of religion. Cultural evolutionary processes, they argue, have
indeed recruited these cognitive predispositions to solve the secular problem of maintaining har-
mony and cooperation in largescale societies. This is not mere conjecture. In support of their hypoth-
esis they provide us with an extensive overview of empirical ﬁndings in psychological, historical and
anthropological research (Atran & Henrich, 2010, pp. 19–23).
Nevertheless, Atran and Henrich (2010), Norenzayan (2013), and Norenzayan et al. (2016) pro-
vide us with only half the story of how these “cultural complexes”—i.e., modern large-scale religions
—have evolved (24). Importantly, I will argue that those religions are social institutions. As any other
social institution they are shaped by a series of cultural dynamics. One important dynamic is indeed
cultural group selection driven by group competition. But, while it is the sole focus of current
accounts of the cultural evolution of religion, it is not the only dynamic that enters into play. In
order to understand the evolution of institutional religions and explain their features, we should
take a series of other cultural dynamics into account. These dynamics do not arise from competition
between groups—dynamics I will refer to as “between-group dynamics”—but from within the group.
The latter I call “within-group dynamics.” They too have an important role in shaping religious
beliefs, devotions and practices.
It should be clear that my aim is not to reject the synthesis proposed by these authors, but to
enrich it. The account I am proposing is very much in line with the account they have put forward.
Our religious beliefs and practices are indeed the product of both genetic and cultural evolutionary
processes. Like Atran and Henrich (2010), Norenzayan (2013), and Norenzayan et al. (2016), I
believe that modern religions have been shaped by cultural evolutionary processes recruiting our
genetically wired proclivity to adopt religious beliefs and engage in religious devotions and practices.
However, while the emphasis on cultural group selection is warranted—it explains the secular utility
of institutional religions (Durkheim, 1995)—there are other important dynamics in the mix.
Drawing from game-theoretic analyses of the emergence and evolution of social conventions and
institutions (Aoki, 2001; Binmore, 2005; Guala, 2016; Lewis, 1969; North, 1990), I bring these
dynamics to light. The upshot of this is not merely conceptual. Bringing these dynamics into account
enables us to explain prominent features of institutional religions that cannot be adequately
explained by current models of the cultural evolution of religion. More precisely, within-group
dynamics explain the existence of important non-adaptive features of institutional religions and
the abundance of religious compensators or rewards in institutional religions. It also sheds a new
light on the existence of numerous constraints on petitionary prayer and the particular public char-
acter of religious practices (as well as the process of secularization in parts of Europe).
In section 2, I explain what it means for a religion to be institutional. I address the question why
institutional religions have emerged and brieﬂy outline what cultural dynamics shape their features.
In section 3, I zoom in on the “within-group dynamics,” which have been overlooked in Atran and
Henrich’s (2010), Norenzayan’s (2013), and Norenzayan et al.’s (2016) account. In section 4, I show
how these dynamics enable us to explain prominent features of institutional religions which cannot
be satisfactorily explained if we only invoke cultural group selection. In section 5, I conclude.
2. Religion as a social institution
2.1. What are social institutions?
North (1990, p. 3) deﬁnes social institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human
interactions.” Those constraints arise from imposing a deontic proﬁle: an external imposition of
costs and rewards associated with particular behaviors. Doing so, social institutions create rights
and obligations. Borders, for instance, permit residents to roam within their conﬁnes and might
not permit foreigners in or impose something on them. Marriage typically permits partners sexual
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access to each other, but does not permit it to third parties. Property of an object permits free use to
the proprietor and not to third parties. And the list goes on. If there is no deontic proﬁle—no do’s
and don’ts—governing a particular area of human interaction, that area is not institutionalized.
Deﬁned in this way, it should be clear that religion is not institutional by deﬁnition. Religion is
possible without any constraints on human interaction. It could very well be a matter of personal
conviction or even unconstrained communal experience. Contrast this with a social institution
like marriage, which is by deﬁnition institutional. Were there no rights and obligations imposed
by marriage, it would not qualify as a marriage but rather as unconstrained coupling behavior.
Note that not any type of obligation would make a religion institutional. Only social obligations,
the kind of obligations that aﬀect other people. These obligations can be formal, such as sharia law
enforced by Muslim courts, or informal such as the Christian obligation to donate charity to the
poor. People engaging on their own accord in sacriﬁces to a deity in order to obtain divine favors,
would by this rationale not make a religion institutional since it is not an obligation that is imposed
by or aﬀects other people. Note also that the kind of social obligations that make a religion insti-
tutional are not per se moral obligations. They can very well be immoral (e.g., hostility towards
the outgroup) or amoral (e.g., obligation to fast), as long as they constrain human interaction. In
short, the institutional aspect of a religion is not a matter of me versus God, but of me versus others.
Religions, however, cannot be expected to fall neatly into two clearly demarcated categories: insti-
tutional and non-institutional. They are distributed along a continuum, ranging from heavily insti-
tutionalized religions such as Christianity and Islam to non-institutional (or weakly institutional)
religions such as animistic religions. Institutional religions are ﬁlled to the brim with social obli-
gations. Tellingly, of the ﬁve pillars in Islam, four of them impose obligations—pray 5 times a
day, fast once a year, support the needy, and make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a life-
time—while only one concerns belief: belief that there is no god except God. In a similar vein, Chris-
tian religions impose a plethora of social obligations on their participants (such as fasting, engaging
in charity, and abiding by norms regarding sexuality and reproduction). On the other end of the con-
tinuum, you have the non- or barely institutionalized religions such as animistic religions imbuing
the world with spiritual essence and interpreting its working along those lines, but crucially not (or at
least not to the same extent) organizing human groups in certain ways. The question whether there
are any religions (or have been) which are entirely void of any institutionalization—as deﬁned above
—is open for debate and would take us beyond the scope of this paper.1
2.2. Why do social institutions emerge?
Social institutions do not emerge as “dei ex machina” for no particular reason. They emerge to solve
pre-existing problems of cooperation in particular domains of interaction. These problems of
cooperation range from problems of pure coordination to problems of competition (Guala, 2016).
A problem of coordination arises when there are diﬀerent ways of achieving a commonly desired
result and the diﬀerent actors need to agree on a way to achieve this. A good example is driving
on the same side of the road to avoid collisions. It does not matter what side is picked, as long as
everybody picks the same side. Problems of competition, on the other hand, arise when self-inter-
ested individual strategies lead to an outcome that is undesirable for the group. A good example
is the use and acquisition of resources. In a non-institutional context where property is not enforced,
individual actors will often beneﬁt more from adopting predatory strategies to acquire goods than
take the risk of producing goods. The result at the group level is detrimental, since the total amount
of resources in this “non-cooperative equilibrium” will be inferior to the amount in the “cooperative
equilibrium” where property is sanctioned and since there will be costly conﬂict (Vlerick, 2016).
Many problems, however, are somewhere on a continuum between pure coordination and pure
competition. In both cases social institutions are beneﬁcial at the group level.
Similarly, religions have been institutionalized to solve pre-existing problems of cooperation.
Were there no such problems to be solved with religion, it would most likely not have been
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institutionalized. Our proclivity to adopt religious beliefs and engage in religious practices would not
have been recruited to organize social groups. So what kind of cooperation problems are solved by
institutional religions? There is no shortage of examples and they include both coordination and
competition problems. Wilson (2002) devotes a whole book to the social functionality of religion
and discusses a wide range of examples. One striking example is the so-called water temple system
in Bali. This “extravagantly otherworldly” system, as Wilson (2002, p. 91) puts it, coordinates when
farmers plant and irrigate their rice ﬁelds, when they ﬂood or burn it for pest control and when they
grow other crops for the same reason. It involves thousands of farmers and is an impressive case of a
religious system solving very complex coordination problems in a very eﬃcient way.2 It also solves
competition problems. It regulates the use of water—ensuring that all farmers have enough to irri-
gate their ﬁelds and do not use more than their fair share—and it imposes the necessary maintenance
work on the various waterways (making sure that everybody contributes to keep those vital common
goods in good shape).
Other examples of religions solving problems of coordination and competition abound. From
preserving ﬁsh stock in Native American communities in the Klamath valley (Rossano, 2010,
p. 76) over the Jewish ten commandments increasing harmony and cooperation within the commu-
nity to Calvinism which, according to Wilson (2002, p. 118) “is an interlocking system with a pur-
pose: to unify and coordinate a population of people to achieve a common set of goals by collective
action.” In fact, in order to drive his point home that religions are highly adaptive at the group level,
Wilson (2002) has taken religions at random from a sixteen-volume encyclopedia of religion3 and
found that all of them exhibit secular utility.4 They all organize or organized groups in ways that
beneﬁted the group by solving problems of cooperation within those groups.
The central question is: why are religious beliefs and practices such eﬃcient tools in solving pro-
blems of cooperation? If religion was not particularly well suited to solve these secular problems, it
would—as I have pointed out above—most likely not have been institutionalized. This is not a trivial
question. There is nothing inherently cooperative about religious beliefs and practices. Nor does
entertaining beliefs in supernatural entities and engaging in various practices that would qualify
as religious automatically make people more cooperative.
2.3. How do religions solve problems of cooperation?
Before addressing how religions solve problems of cooperation, we must take a step back and brieﬂy
discuss the origin of human cooperation. Cooperation is something humans happen to excel at.
Throughout our history we sustained high levels cooperation within our groups. For this we evolved
a series of moral intuitions motivating us to cooperate with our fellow group members and to punish
individuals who did not reciprocate. In short, morality evolved in humans for in-group cooperation.
As Tomasello and Vaish (2013, p. 231) squarely state it “from an evolutionary perspective, morality
is a form of cooperation” (see also Vlerick, 2017).
While our moral psychology enabled us to cooperate intensively in the small-scale, homogenous
hunter-gatherer groups in which we lived for most of our evolutionary history, it is powerless when it
comes to maintaining that cooperation and harmony in the large-scale groups that emerged when we
traded our hunter-gathering lifestyle for that of sedentary farmers. In this new social context, har-
mony and cooperation could no longer be sustained by kin-selection (favoring one’s genetic kin)
and the moral machinery enabling us to engage in reciprocal altruism (helping fellow group mem-
bers in the expectation that the favor will be returned in the future). In anonymous and often one-
time interactions we can no longer rely on personal acquaintance and reputation tracking (monitor-
ing whether the favors are indeed returned) to ensure that free-riders—who abuse the cooperative
system by beneﬁting from the favors of others while not returning any—don’t get away with their
cooperation eroding behavior (see also Atran & Henrich, 2010; Norenzayan, 2013; Norenzayan
et al. 2016).
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In order to maintain harmony and cooperation in these large groups, a series of important cul-
tural solutions arose. Most notably social institutions such as property, criminal law, and commons
management emerged. These institutions imposed punishments on individuals who threatened the
harmony and cooperation within the group. Doing so, they protected that harmony and cooperation
(Vlerick, 2016). But religion also played an important role. As Teehan (2016, p. 8) points out: “one
means for extending the reach of our evolved moral tools was the development of religions.”Modern
religions, Teehan (2010, p. 192) argues, are institutionalizations of a moral code to foster cooperation
and maintain social cohesion in large-scale societies. Norenzayan’s (2013) seconds that, claiming
that religion had a pivotal role in the transition from small-scale hunter-gathering groups to large
scale agricultural (and later industrial) groups.
How does this work? How do religious beliefs and practices contribute to scaling human
cooperation by solving problems of coordination and competition? They do so in a variety of
ways. First, communal participation in religious rituals increases the empathic concern participants
have for the other participants. This, in turn, leads them to behave more altruistically towards their
fellow worshipers. It increases trust and decreases cheating within the religious community (Teehan,
2016, p. 17).
The actual mechanisms boosting empathic concern through communal religious practices are
twofold. Firstly, engaging in synchronous movement, a key element of many communal religious
rituals (e.g., synchronous dancing, praying, chanting), increases the empathic concern participants
have for one another (Cohen, Mundry, & Kirshner, 2014; Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fisher, 2014; Valde-
solo & DeSteno, 2011). Secondly, communal participation in religious practices is a means of signal-
ing in-group status to one another. As Matthews (2012, p. 220) points out, these rituals are
“ecologically arbitrary forms of behavior.” In other words, they are peculiar forms of behavior per-
taining to a particular group. Engaging in these kinds of behavior functions to signal membership to
the group. It shapes a shared identity which in turn binds people together in “close-knit” commu-
nities (Wilson, 2002, p. 104). This triggers the empathic concern we naturally feel for people in our
close concentric circles (Teehan, 2016, p. 17). For the same reason, many religions use a rhetoric of
ﬁctive kinship. God is referred to as the “father” and the faithful are “brothers” and “sisters.” This too
is a way to trigger the empathic concern we naturally feel for close kin (Teehan, 2016, p. 17).
In this way, religion—from the Latin “religio,” literally “to bind together”—has historically been a
powerful tool to bind (large) groups together in cooperative units. The trust it generates within the
group makes it easier for group members to coordinate with one another, as coordination requires
trust. (It will only be beneﬁcial for me to do my part in a coordinated eﬀort if I can trust others to do
their part). Moreover, the empathic concern it generates within the group plays an important part in
overcoming competition problems. People are less likely to cheat one another (even if they could
personally beneﬁt from doing so) if they take each other’s well-being at heart. But when it comes
to dealing with competition problems, religion has another card up its sleeve.
To overcome the infamous free-rider problem (central to problems of competition), free-riders
must be punished (Henrich & Boyd, 2001). If the altruistic cooperation of others can be exploited,
individuals who will do so have an edge over cooperators. Therefore they will outcompete these
cooperators and erode the cooperation. Other social institutions—such as commons management
—maintain cooperation in large groups (where reputation tracking no longer does the trick) by
imposing social norms (how much of the common resource one can use, how one must contribute
to keep the common resource in good shape, etc.) and punishing transgressors.
The same goes for many institutional religions. They impose social norms and punish transgres-
sors by invoking moral gods.5 On the one hand, invoking moral gods punishes transgressors
indirectly by motivating people in the group to punish these norm breakers. By framing rules as ema-
nating from the will of God, those rules become sacred. Breaking them becomes a bigger deal than
when those rules are perceived as merely “worldly” rules. The moral outrage felt by the people within
the group when someone breaks them is therefore increased and so is the likelihood that people will
actually punish the wrongdoers6 and the severity with which they punish them.
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On the other hand the introduction of morally interested gods punishes free-riders directly. It
does so by convincing potential free-riders and rule-breakers that their cooperation eroding behavior
will be met with supernatural punishment. This is the central claim of the so-called “supernatural
punishment hypothesis.” Powerful moralizing gods, such as the Abrahamic God, strongly deter
from norm violation, according to Atran and Henrich (2010), Norenzayan (2013), and Norenzayan
et al. (2016). They do so because they are believed to punish transgressing behavior (sinners go to
hell) and to monitor behavior when no one is around to watch. This combination makes them won-
derfully suited to keep people in line. The perceived punishment for free-riding is radically increased
as is the chance of being caught red-handed. “Watched people are nice people,” Norenzayan (2013)
points out.
This is backed by experimental research shows that priming religious people with “a watching
god” makes them more altruistic and less likely to cheat (see Atran & Henrich, 2010; Norenzayan,
2013 and Rossano, 2010 for an overview). More generally, a rapidly growing body of empirical
research links belief in moral gods with increased prosocial behavior (Ahmed & Salas, 2011; Atkin-
son & Bourrat, 2011; Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Bering, 2006; Johnson & Kruger, 2004; McKay, Eﬀer-
son, Whitehouse, & Fehr, 2011; Norenzayan, 2013; Shariﬀ & Norenzayan, 2007, 2011; Shariﬀ &
Rhemtulla, 2012).
However, since those supernatural punishments are not actual worldly punishments, the system is
vulnerable to exploitation. Free-riders could feign religious beliefs. Doing so, they would convince
their fellow group members that they too abide by the sacred rules, while in fact they do not.
They could proﬁt from the beneﬁts generated by this intensively cooperating religious group, with-
out engaging in any of the imposed social obligations (since they would not be fearing God’s watchful
eye and severe punishments). This is an important problem for prosocial religions. They are, as Ian-
naccone (1992) points out, “club goods.” They generate a positive return for members.7 Therefore,
they are inherently vulnerable to free-riding: to being abused by people who proﬁt from being per-
ceived as members without paying their “membership fee” (i.e., not taking on any of the obligations).
In fact, as a reviewer has rightly pointed out to me, this “supernatural punishment system”might
even create a selective pressure for the evolution of such free-riding religious hypocrites. They would
have a clear advantage in terms of survival and reproduction over religious, norm abiding individuals
and therefore pass on more of their non-religious, free-riding predispositions to the next generation.8
For the system to survive, therefore, free-riding must be prevented.
What is required to keep free-riders out of the “club,” is a sure-ﬁre way to distinguish genuine
believers from religious hypocrites. A “hard-to-fake” signal of genuine commitment (Irons, 2001).
Such signaling, as it turns out, is rampant in religions. From fasting and pilgrimages over painful
rituals such as ﬂagellation, scariﬁcation and reenacted cruciﬁxion to martyrdom, these extravagant
practices engaged in by the faithful signal genuine commitment to the religion to fellow worshipers.
They do so precisely because they are so costly.
Professing belief in some god is easy, ﬁre-walking to prove one’s commitment not so much. As
Irons (2001, p. 298) points out: “other things being equal, the costlier the signal the less likely it is
to be false.” This is why these extravagant practices are so common in religions, according to
Irons (2001), Sosis (2003, 2006), Bulbulia and Sosis (2011). These practices (culturally) evolved to
protect those altruistically cooperating religious communities against free-riding religious hypo-
crites. They deter potential free-riders from entering the community and enable the members to sep-
arate the committed members from the less committed ones and discriminate in trust. This is not
mere conjecture. On the one hand, Aimone, Iannaccone, Makowsky, and Rubin (2013) have tested
the hypothesis that imposing personal sacriﬁces on members counteracts free-riding in a public good
experiment. As expected, they found that groups imposing higher sacriﬁces were better able to screen
out free-riders and increase the public good. On the other hand, Sosis and Bressler (2003, p. 223)
found that on average the more costly requirements religious communes impose on their members,
the longer-lived these communes are.
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As Sosis (2003) points out, these signals must be costly enough to oﬀset the beneﬁts of free-riding.
As long as the beneﬁts of joining the religious “club” outweigh the costs to be considered a member,
the system is open for abuse. In that case, free-riding religious hypocrites would beneﬁt from per-
forming the costly rituals in order to reap the rewards of the group’s altruism. But this poses a pro-
blem. If the costs of signaling membership outweigh the beneﬁts of being a member, why would
anyone join? There would be no risk of free-riding, but the religion would no longer be a “club
good” (Iannaccone, 1992). This could lead to the demise of the religion.9
Sosis (2003) oﬀers a solution to the problem. On the one hand these (costly) ritual practices
engender belief. People abhor cognitive dissonance. When their actions are not in line with their
beliefs, they often change their beliefs. So by engaging in practices that signal commitment to reli-
gious beliefs, people are actually prone to develop that commitment and adopt the beliefs. (Even
if initially they may only have partaken in order to reap the beneﬁts of membership to the commu-
nity). So imposing signals of genuine commitment do not only serve to keep hypocrites out, it also
converts hypocrites into true believers.
On the other hand, costly signals need only outweigh the beneﬁts of membership in the percep-
tion of outsiders who may otherwise abuse the system. Fasting, frequent praying and pilgrimages are
costly for both believers and non-believers. But they are not considered as being as costly by people
who genuinely believe that failing to uphold these practices will end in eternal damnation as they are
for non-believers who do not entertain such beliefs (Sosis, 2003, p. 103). Costly signals should not
deter genuine believers, only potential free-riding religious hypocrites in their cost—beneﬁt analysis.
So in order to solve problems of (large-scale) cooperation, religions have culturally evolved an
amalgam of features: rituals for bonding and in-group signaling, supernatural punishers to keep
people in line and costly signals to keep free-riders out. These institutional religions recruited our
predisposition for entertaining religious beliefs and engaging in religious practices in order to
solve secular problems of coordination and competition. In order to properly understand how
these “packages of rituals, devotions and beliefs” (Atran & Henrich, 2010, p. 19) have been shaped,
we need to take a closer look at what drives their cultural evolution.
2.4. What shapes social institutions?
Social institutions impose a deontic proﬁle (rights and obligations) on members of a group (the par-
ticipants to the social institution). Doing so they organize the group in a particular way in order to
“solve” pre-existing problems of cooperation. In game theoretic terms, social institutions set out the
rules of the game and are eﬃcient to the extent that they increase the total payoﬀ of the game for its
participants (Binmore, 2005; Vlerick, 2016). Some institutions will be more eﬃcient in solving those
pre-existing problems and maximizing the total payoﬀ for the group than others. Groups with such
institutions will on average outcompete other groups with less eﬃcient institutions. As the outcome
of cultural group selection, the most eﬃcient social institutions or institutional features prevail at the
expense of less eﬃcient counterparts. This selective process shaping social institutions is the ﬁrst
dynamic. I call it “between-group dynamics.”
Between-group dynamics come about through group competition and result in the most eﬃcient
institutional models (yielding the largest payoﬀ for the group) being selected over less eﬃcient
models. This important insight is at the core of the cultural evolution theory of religion proposed
by Atran and Henrich (2010), Norenzayan (2013), and Norenzayan et al. (2016). They rightly
point out that cultural group selection shaped religious beliefs, practices and devotions in such a
way as to galvanize prosocial norms and enhance large scale cooperation. Indeed, religions or reli-
gious features that were able to solve the problem of (large-scale) cooperation were selected over
other religions and/or religious features.
Note that these cooperation enhancing, culturally adaptive features can come about through blind
trial and error or foresighted design or anything in between those two extremes. Some adaptive fea-
tures may have creeped in the religious system through pure chance and subsequently spread. On the
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other end of the spectrum, some authority ﬁgure may have altered religious beliefs and/or practices
precisely to create the intended culturally adaptive feature (such as enhanced cooperation or social
harmony). Calvin’s reforms, for instance, are said to be speciﬁcally tailored to the societal context of
16th Century Geneva in which they were ﬁrst implemented (Wilson, 2002, p. 71).
While cooperation has been getting all of the attention in Atran and Henrich’s (2010) paper, there
are other important adaptive features in the deontic proﬁles imposed by institutional religions that
emerge through group competition. Features such as incentivizing procreation, proselytism, as well
as out-group hostility and warfare—key features accounting for the cultural success of religions such
as Christianity and Islam—have a very important role in spreading a religion. Whereas enhancing
cooperation and in-group harmony indirectly promotes the expansion of a religion (through the suc-
cess of the group at the expense of less eﬃciently organized groups), the latter features are directly
related to spreading the religion. Those features are not solutions to the pre-existing problem(s)
solved by institutional religion. They are nevertheless the product of cultural group selection driven
by group competition and are directly connected to the cultural success of religions that have inte-
grated them.
Cultural evolution through group competition, however, is not the only dynamic shaping insti-
tutional religions and eﬃciency is not the sole outcome. In addition to between-group dynamics
any social institution is also subjected to within-group dynamics. By and large, the latter have
been overlooked and bringing them to the attention fosters a series of new insights into what shapes
institutional religions.
3. Within-group dynamics
Deontic proﬁles do not emerge out of thin air, fully formed and ready to enter this cultural selective
process. Rather, they emerge from the bottom up. More particularly, they emerge from the dynamic
interplay of strategies adopted by the individual participants and are maintained as long as these
strategies hold each other in equilibrium. As Guala (2016) points out, institutions are rules in equili-
brium. If any participant has an incentive to deviate she will do so. When enough participants do so
they change the dynamics of the game, upsetting the equilibrium and ultimately the social
institution.
Moreover, competition between institutions and institutional features does not only happen at the
level of groups (in which more eﬃcient institutions or institutional features outcompete less eﬃcient
counterparts) but also within the group. Some institutions and/or institutional features will get more
traction from the members than others and therefore outcompete those. That competitive advantage
may come from being more attractive and/or being more protective (i.e., better able to retain its par-
ticipants). The latter three dynamics—stability (convergence to and maintenance in equilibrium
states), attractiveness, and protectiveness—I refer to as “within-group dynamics.” These dynamics,
as signposted earlier, have been overlooked by the current cultural evolutionary accounts of religion.
3.1. Stability
The ﬁrst set of within-group dynamics are the constraints that follow from stability. The costs and
rewards imposed on strategies adopted by the participants must be such and must be maintained in
such a way that nobody (or at least not many) have an incentive to deviate from acting in the way
required to uphold the institution. If many participants do have such an incentive, they will follow
suit and the “game” is kicked out of equilibrium. Consequently, the institution either evolves into
something else or disintegrates altogether.
Rules, as Guala (2016, p. 7) points out, are only followed to the extent that people are incentivized
to do so. Binmore (2005, p. 12), in this regard, argues that social contracts (culturally evolved rights
and obligations imposed on the participants of a group) do not (and cannot) require individuals to
sacriﬁce for the group. The same goes for the social obligations imposed by religion. People will only
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abide by those rules to the extent that they perceive that it is in their self-interest. This important
point has been developed by Stark (1997) who argues that individual religious behavior is based
on rational choice. Participants weigh costs and beneﬁts in view of maximizing their net beneﬁt.
This imposes an important constraint on the social obligations imposed by religions (as it does
for any other social institution). As long as participants have a personal beneﬁt by deviating from
the actions the institution imposes on them, they will do so and cause the demise of the institution.
A social institution therefore can only be stable when its participants maximize their personal
payoﬀ given the structure of the game (rules) and the strategies adopted by other players. This is
known as a Nash equilibrium in game theory. In a Nash equilibrium no player can improve his
payoﬀ by unilateral action. Whenever you have a domain of interaction in which all individuals
attempt to maximize their payoﬀ independently of one another (without coordinating with the
other players) and their payoﬀ depends on what other individuals are doing, that domain of inter-
action will gravitate to a Nash equilibrium. This happens automatically. Given that all participants to
the game pursue their own self-interest, they will alter their strategy as long as they have an interest
to do so. The game only stabilizes in a Nash equilibrium, and therefore continues to evolve until it
reaches such a point. Those equilibria are ubiquitous. They are found in radically diﬀerent contexts
ranging from naturally selected animal instincts (Smith & Price, 1973), over social conventions
(Lewis, 1969), to international law (Ohlin, 2011).
To see how the process works imagine in the context of a pure coordination problem, how a social
institution imposing traﬃc rules might arise. Assuming that in the hypothetical pre-institutional
state people drive on both sides of the road, unable to avoid costly collisions with oncoming
traﬃc. Drivers, however, would be incentivized to start driving on the side of the road on which
most people drive and the game would soon stabilize to a situation in which all drivers drive on
the same side. In this state the game is in Nash-equilibrium, where nobody has an incentive to devi-
ate from her strategy.
The payoﬀ matrix of the “driving game” clearly shows how all drivers beneﬁt from either all
choosing the left side or all choosing the right side (and getting a payoﬀ of 10 instead of 0):
Left Right
Left 10, 10 0, 0
Right 0, 0 10, 10
Given that the strategy of any given player depends on the payoﬀ structure of the game (or, more
accurately in the context of institutions, her perception of the payoﬀ structure of the game) and
the strategies adopted by other players (or, again more accurately, her perception of these strategies),
the stability of the game depends on two important conditions. The ﬁrst condition is that the sub-
jective perception of the payoﬀ structure of the game remains more or less constant. The second is
that the expectation is maintained that the other players will stick to their strategy in the future. If
either the perception of some players of the game changes or they expect other players to deviate
from their strategies, these players will be incentivized to alter their strategy because their best
response to what other players are doing given the structure of the game changes. Consequently,
the game is kicked out of equilibrium.
Aoki (2001, p. 4) points out that if subjective perception is upset and “a state of general perceptual
crisis” ensues, there will be a search for new subjective models (new understanding of the underlying
structure of the institution) until a new equilibrium is reached. Take Marxism for instance. Accord-
ing to Taylor (1985, 94), Marx’s theory radically changed the perception of capitalist society and its
institutions. What appeared to be free contractual exchange between two independent agents (indus-
trial owner and laborer), is now reframed in terms of a power structure, where laborers are forced to
sell their labor for subsistence at a price many times lower than the proﬁt they generate for the own-
ers. This changed the subjective perception of these capitalist institutions held by a large chunk of the
participants to these institutions—the so-called proletariat—which in turn altered their strategy
(opting for revolution) and caused the subsequent demise of the social institutional system.
RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 9
The stability of a social institution—as explained above—also depends on the expectation that the
other participants will act as they have before. It therefore depends on what Lewis (1969) has called
“common knowledge.” Common knowledge arises when all the participants do not only know some-
thing, but also know that everybody else knows this and that everybody else knows they know this. In
the context of social institutions, these recursive inferences create the expectation that the other par-
ticipants will pursue their strategy, which in turn is necessary for stability.
They do so for the following reason. Given that I know that what others have been doing is a best
response to what I’m doing, I can expect them to keep doing what they have been doing as long as I
keep doing what I have been doing. They in turn expect me to keep to my strategy to the extent that
they keep to theirs (since they too know that my strategy is a best response to theirs). In other words,
if we all know, not only what others have been doing but also that they have an incentive to keep
doing that as long as everybody else keeps doing what they have been doing and everybody
knows this (of everybody else), nobody will have an incentive to change strategy and the game is
locked in a stable equilibrium.
In the context of religion, as Stark (1997) argued, it will only be rational for adherents to take on
the costly altruistic obligations towards other adherents imposed by the religion, as long as many
others do so. Because then the potential payoﬀ outweighs the costs because one can expect to be
the recipient of these altruistic gestures from others. In order to determine whether to take on the
costs, however, one needs to know that others will also do so (because only then does it become ben-
eﬁcial to do so). For this you need common knowledge.
This common knowledge is created through signaling in-group status. This is the central point of
Matthews (2012) “recognition signal hypothesis.” Religious signaling, it should be clear, does not
only serve the purpose of keeping free-riders out (solving problems of competition) but also to ident-
ify coreligionists (solving problems of coordination). This signaling is often “cheaper,” such as wear-
ing a Muslim veil or a “bindi” (a Hindu dot). Costly signals are only needed for dealing with
problems of competition posed by altruistic cooperation (where an individual sacriﬁces some
immediate ﬁtness for a delayed ﬁtness reward), not for dealing with problems of coordination
posed by mutualistic cooperation (where there’s an immediate reward for all parties). In the latter
case—such as for instance signaling belonging to a religious community for marrying a coreligionist
(Matthews, 2016)—there is no risk of dishonest signaling (for the purposes of free-riding) and sig-
naling does not need to be costly.
3.2. Attractiveness
The second kind of within-group dynamics is what I called “attractiveness.” Institutions and/or insti-
tutional features do not just compete with each other by organizing groups as eﬃciently as possible
and giving them a competitive edge over other groups (between-group dynamic), they also compete
for traction within the group. Individuals will only participate in social institutions in general and
religion in particular when they perceive they beneﬁt from it (Binmore, 2005; Guala, 2016; Stark,
1997). Institutional religions therefore compete for allegiance by attracting participation.
The same goes for religions. The idea that religions compete with each other for allegiance is the
central point of Finke and Stark’s (1992): “The churching of America.” In their seminal work, they
analyze the rise and decline of religious denominations in the US as the outcome of a “free market”
competition between these denominations. This is a key insight of the so-called “economics of reli-
gion” and has been explored and developed more recently by Jelen (2002). Some religions or reli-
gious features get more traction than others. The steep rise of Christianity, for instance, that led
to demise of the pagan Roman religion can be attributed according to Stark (1997, p. 167) because
“Christianity was by far the best religious “bargain” around.” Three major factors contribute to the
attractiveness of a religion.
The ﬁrst is the extent to which it is centered around salient practices and beliefs. The more those
beliefs and practices are intuitively compelling, the more psychologically appealing the religion
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becomes. This is nothing new of course. The founding premise of the cognitive science of religion is
that religious beliefs and behavior are constrained by human psychological nature. Not only do reli-
gious beliefs and practices emerge from cognitive and aﬀective predispositions, these predispositions
also hold religions on a leash in their evolution. Intuitively compelling elements keep creeping back
into religions, despite the sometimes arduous eﬀorts of theologians to enforce an oﬃcial doctrine.
Boyer (2001, p. 281) aptly refers to this as the “tragedy of the theologian.” When push comes to
shove, the beliefs adhered to and the practices engaged in by the members of a religious community
are determined by those members. Their predilection for intuitively appealing beliefs and practices
steer religion in a particular direction.
Secondly, costly signaling in religion, which Henrich (2009) calls “credibility enhancing displays,”
are not only mechanisms to keep religious free-riders out, they are also powerful tools to attract par-
ticipation. Not because these displays are intuitively appealing to their participants but because they
have a persuasive eﬀect. Exposure to these signals of genuine commitment to the religion have been
linked to increased theism (Lanman & Buhrmester, 2017). Therefore, in the context of the within-
group dynamics developed in this paper, these displays—ubiquitous in institutional religions—can
be seen to serve two other functions. The ﬁrst is to signal commitment to others necessary for creat-
ing the expectation that adherents will keep paying the social costs imposed on them (stick to their
strategy) which stabilizes the game through common knowledge. The second is to attract partici-
pation by showcasing an unwavering commitment to the religion. Martyrdom in early Christianity,
for instance, is considered to have had an important instrumental role in spreading Christianity
(Stark, 1997).
Thirdly, given that institutions and institutional features compete for allegiance within the group,
we can expect there to be many rewarding features in religions. Reasoning from a rational choice
model of adherence to a religion, features such as a promised blissful afterlife, forgiving of sins,
and being the object of divine love and care, have an important attractive character. Stark calls
such features “religious compensators.”He argues that, despite the uncertain nature of these religious
promises, “they oﬀer the prospect of huge rewards, rewards that are otherwise not plausibly obtain-
able from any other source” (Stark, 1997, p. 169). This makes them, and associated with them reli-
gions, especially attractive. Consequently, those features can be expected to be rampant, as the
outcome of within-group dynamics.
3.3. Protectiveness
In their competition for traction within the group, institutions do not only have a competitive advan-
tage when they are attractive, but also when they are protective. This is especially relevant for reli-
gious institutions in the context of a free market of religions (Finke & Stark, 1992; Iannaccone, 1992),
where many diﬀerent denominations compete for allegiance. Religious institutions that make both
religious and secular alternatives10 less attractive will have an edge over others.
Institutional religions do so, according to Iannaccone (1992), by imposing a “tax” on those
alternatives. By imposing important behavioral restrictions (such as food taboos rampant in many
religions,11 prohibitions to conduct business on Sabbath for Jews, imposed celibacy for catholic
priests and monks, etc.) they make alternatives less accessible and therefore ultimately less attractive
to their members. These restrictions inhibit participation and reduce productivity in alternative con-
texts, as Iannaccone (1992, p. 275) points out. It is a powerful mechanism to prevent members of
participating in competing institutional contexts (especially in secular institutions). So, in addition
to preventing free-riding and attracting participants, imposing costly behavior on the faithful func-
tions a means to protect membership.
In this context, Iannaccone (1997) argues that most successful sects maintain a certain amount
of tension with the surrounding society. Similarly, Berman (2000), explains the rise of ultra-ortho-
dox Judaism (where prohibitions and obligations on members are increased) as a protective
response to secular alternatives becoming more attractive (because of rising wages). By increasing
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the restrictions on the faithful, they are increasingly isolated from the surrounded society and
increasingly stigmatized by members of that society. This, in turn, discourages the faithful from
joining secular activities.
4. Extending the explanatory scope
A theoretical framework is only as good as its explanatory power. What do within-group dynamics
add to our understanding of religion? I believe they explain four prominent features of institutional
religions which are either left unexplained by Atran and Henrich’s (2010), Norenzayan’s (2013), and
Norenzayan et al. (2016) explanatory model or—to the very least—are not satisfactorily explained if
we only take cultural group selection driven by group competition into consideration.
4.1. Non-adaptive features
The ﬁrst is that we should expect there to be some non-adaptive features in institutional religion.
Features which do not only fail to contribute to solving the pre-existing problem for which the social
institution evolved as a solution but actually counteract some of the adaptive features that were
selected as the outcome of between-group dynamics. These features are the result of the dynamic
interplay between individual, self-interested strategies shaping the deontic proﬁle of the social insti-
tution bottom-up.
A good example of such a counteractive non-adaptive feature creeping into to the religious sys-
tem, I believe, is the Medieval Catholic practice of trading indulgences. This practice reduced the
amount of supernatural punishment (time spent in hell or purgatory) one had to undergo for
one’s sins against payment. It ﬂies in the face of the culturally selected function of religion as enhan-
cing cooperation by enforcing norm abidance through supernatural monitoring and punishment.
Transgressors who can aﬀord it, can now buy their way out of punishment and are therefore less
incentivized to abide by the rules. It does however make a lot of sense from a within-group perspec-
tive in which individuals are out to maximize their personal payoﬀ within the system. Any given
time, therefore, that two parties can mutually increase their payoﬀ, they can be expected to do so.
Indulgences do just that. They beneﬁt the clergy selling these indulgences and they beneﬁt the people
who can aﬀord it. Win-win at the individual level, even though it comes at the expense of the group-
level payoﬀ.
To this a reviewer has rightly objected that indulgences do not decrease punishment for deviant
behavior, rather they substitute a real worldly punishment (the money one pays for absolution) for
an imagined supernatural punishment. However, whereas originally one could only buy indul-
gences for past sins, the practice evolved so that eventually one could also buy indulgences for
future sins one might commit (or even sins one planned on committing). A notorious monk
named Johann Tetzel is said to have sold indulgences on the market place claiming that: “even
the sins you shall hereafter desire to commit, shall be all forgiven you. There is no sin so great
that indulgence cannot remit. Pay, only pay largely, and you shall be forgiven.” (Guinness,
1887). To the extent that indulgences were purchased for future sins, it is the reasonable to assume
that the practice did (at least in some cases) relax norm abidance for those who could aﬀord it
(and therefore was counter adaptive).
Therefore, over and above the fact that human psychology will constrain the process of cul-
tural group selection leading to adaptive features—given that psychological dispositions are
recruited by this process (Atran & Henrich, 2010)—constraints to adaptive eﬃciency also
arise from another source. Deontic proﬁles of institutional religions are not only the product
of top-down selective forces (cultural group selection) but also of bottom-up forces. In particular
by the dynamic interaction of individuals adopting strategies aimed at maximizing their (indi-
vidual) payoﬀ.
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4.2. Rewarding features
A second important insight is that religious features compete for allegiance within the group.We should
therefore expect to see a plethora of rewarding features in institutional religions, such as heaven, an after-
life, forgiving of sins, and recourse to petitionary prayer. Prima facie, the presence of such features may
seem weak evidence for within-group dynamics. After all, couldn’t those rewarding features also be
explained from a between-group perspective, in which they would have a “carrot” function” to incenti-
vize people to adopt cooperative andother desiredbehavior?A reward tomotivatemembers of the group
to abide by the rules imposed by religion (and selected through group competition).
This line of argument however runs into problems. Shariﬀ and Norenzayan (2011) found out that
belief in a rewarding God leads to more cheating than belief in a punishing God. In a similar vein,
Shariﬀ and Rhemtulla (2012) argue that belief in hell is much more eﬃcient than belief in heaven in
getting people in line. In other words, the stick works better than the carrot. But, as Shariﬀ (in Nor-
enzayan, 2013, p. 52) points out, if you want people to feel good and gain converts, feed them carrots
(i.e., give them heaven). Analyzed from the dichotomy of between- and within-group dynamics
introduced in this paper, you might say that there is a trade-oﬀ between between-group dynamics
selecting for punishing features and within-group dynamics selecting for rewarding features.
More generally, between-group dynamics increase the payoﬀ at the group level by imposing costs
on the individual level, while within-group dynamics increase the payoﬀ at the individual level
(often at the expense of group level payoﬀ). The so-called religious compensators (Stark, 1997,
p. 169) squarely ﬁt in the latter kind of dynamics and are hard to account for from a cultural evol-
utionary perspective focused on between-group dynamics.
4.3. Immunization
Thirdly, given that the stability of a social institution depends on a relatively constant and enduring
subjective model of the institution by its participants, we can expect there to be constraints on reli-
gious practices in order to minimize the chances of what Aoki (2001, p. 4) has called a “cognitive
crisis.” This is especially relevant in the context of religion which—given the supernatural nature
of its belief system—is particularly vulnerable to falsifying evidence.
The most prominent way in which this constraint on practice plays out is in the constraints exhib-
ited in petitionary prayer. Asking god(s) to produce favorable outcomes is common practice in many
religious contexts. People typically pray for better health, success, happiness for themselves and their
loved ones, etc. Interestingly however, as Boudry and De Smedt (2011, p. 456) point out, although
the addressed divinity is typically considered as all-mighty, the way His intervention is solicited is
often in a very subtle way. In general, people tend to prefer psychosocial petitionary prayer (e.g.,
grant me the strength to endure my ordeal) to mechanical petitionary prayer (change the physical
world to remove my ordeal). Similarly, praying for better health is common place, but praying for
an amputated limb to (magically) grow back is rare (Boudry & De Smedt, 2011, p. 458). In short,
interventions which are unambiguously supernatural in nature are typically not requested. Related
to this, when people are asked to reﬂect on the eﬀects of their prayers they describe them in a strik-
ingly indeterminate and abstract way (e.g., support, blessing, trust, etc.), which often stands in stark
contrast to the concrete needs that occasioned their prayers (illness, misfortune, etc.) (Barrett, 2004;
Janssen, De Hart, & Den Draak, 1990) As Janssen and colleagues point out, “it could be argued that
people adapt the intended eﬀects to the experienced eﬀects” (Janssen et al., 1990, p. 105). Add to that
the view that “God works in mysterious ways” (Boudry & De Smedt, 2011)—He may have other
(read better) plans for me—and you get a nearly foolproof self-conﬁrming system of soliciting divine
favors, immune to the unavoidable and blatant falsiﬁcation that would normally follow from such a
practice. The fact that these immunizing strategies entered religious practice makes perfect sense
given the necessity to uphold the belief system in the minds of its adherents for the perpetuation
of the institution.
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4.4. Frequent public practice
A ﬁnal prediction is that, given the crucial role of common knowledge in stabilizing social insti-
tutions, institutional religions will be public aﬀairs. Religious practices can be expected to be carried
out in public where everybody can watch and gauge everybody else’s commitment. Moreover, these
public gatherings can be expected to be frequent. Institutional religion cannot be a private matter,
since—as pointed out above—the institutional aspect of religion is not a matter of me versus
God, but of me versus others. The common knowledge created by a public context is crucial to
cement allegiance. It is more rational for me to participate and engage in the required costly behavior
the more people participate. It is also crucial to enable participants to determine their strategy. How
much cost I will take on depends on how much others take on and therefore expect me to take on.
This—as explained at length above—stabilizes these strategies (I know that you know that I will do so
and so, so I know that your strategy won’t shift in the expectation that mine won’t and vice versa)
and maintains the institution.
In this regard, Chwe (2001, p. 4) argues the rationale behind many public rituals is not merely to
convey information to each member or to enhance bonding and social harmony (or any kind of
emotional eﬀect for that matter), but ﬁrst and foremost to create common knowledge by “letting
audience members know what other audience members know.” Given the importance of common
knowledge for the maintenance of social institutions, this hypothesis is—I believe—on the right track
with regards to practices and rituals found in institutional religions.
It is also ﬁts well with Harvey Whitehouse’s (2004) analysis of the existence of diﬀerent “modes of
religiosity.”Whitehouse famously distinguishes the “imagistic” from the “doctrinal”mode. The ima-
gistic mode involves infrequent and highly emotional, bonding rituals engaged in by small scale
groups adhering to weakly institutionalized religions (such as the tribes in Papua New Guinea
studied by Whitehouse).12 The doctrinal mode, on the other hand, involves frequent but less
emotionally charged public rituals engaged in by large scale groups adhering to heavily institutiona-
lized religions (such as the Muslim call to prayer or the Christian communion). Their function, as
pointed out above, is ﬁrst and foremost to create the necessary common knowledge for the mainten-
ance of the institution. This explains the fact that these “doctrinal” public practices are much more
frequent but less emotionally engaging than their “imagistic” counterparts in non-institutional
religions.
Interestingly in this context, plummeting church attendance in Western Europe and Scandinavia
over the last decades, does not seem to be rooted primarily in a decrease of religious beliefs (such as
belief in God or an afterlife). In fact, while the number of believers in these secularizing societies have
clearly dropped, the number of people attending religious ceremonies has dropped much more. Reli-
gious participation in Sweden, for instance, dropped to 7% in 2001, while belief in God was still at
46%. In Denmark, only 3% of the population attend church weekly, while 62% express belief in God
(Norris & Inglehart, 2011, p. 90). In other words, many members of those societies still hang on to
(some of the) religious beliefs, but no longer partake in the public rituals.
The reason for this, I believe, is that in secularizing societies there is a demise of the institutional
character of religion since all the social functions of institutional religion (solidarity, cooperation,
social harmony, etc.) are taken over by secular institutions (welfare programs, strong legal system,
etc.). With the demise of the institutional character of the religion, the need to acquire common
knowledge fades away and with it the public nature of the religion.
5. Concluding remark
In order to understand many of the features of institutional religions we have to understand what
drives their cultural evolution. We must outline the cultural dynamics that shape these packages
of beliefs, devotions, and rituals that are ubiquitous in human society. This, of course, is a monumen-
tal task. Much work remains to be done. By proposing a new framework outlining the drivers of the
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cultural evolution of institutional religions, I dare hope that I have contributed something of value to
the emerging science of religion.
Notes
1. Teehan (2016) argues that religion has had considerable inﬂuence on human social interaction throughout
human history. Similarly, Rossano (2010, p. 131) believes that religion impacted human social organization
and behavior at a very early period. This would mean that religion had an institutional role throughout
(most of) human history.
2. According to Lansing (1991), the anthropologist who studied the Bali water temple system (Wilson’s (2002)
account is entirely based on his ﬁndings), it is so eﬃcient that when the Dutch arrived there in the 19th century
with all their expertise in farming and engineering waterways, they could see no way of improving the rice
production.
3. The volume in question has been edited by Eliade (1987).
4. At the time of writing he had reviewed six religious systems from his randomly generated list.
5. This is a rather recent phenomenon in the history of religion. In most religions throughout human history, gods
or other supernatural entities were not thought to be interested in the moral behavior of their followers. They
were not thought to be interested in how humans behaved towards one another, only in being the recipient of
their reverence and oﬀerings. In institutional religions such as Judaism (and later Christianity and Islam), that
would change. God became a morally interested party.
6. Punishing somebody is risky behavior (people ﬁght back and you may be the victim of revenge). Therefore
motivating people in the group to punish wrongdoers can help to prevent free-riding by increasing the actual
punishment of free-riders.
7. This is not mere conjecture and still valid today in most parts of the world. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) found
that in the US church attendance directly increases the chance of business success.
8. This may sound outlandish, but in fact religiosity is to a certain extent determined by genetic make-up (Hamer,
2005; Eaves, Martin, & Heath, 1990). So it could very well be the target of genetic selection.
9. Religions, as I will argue below, compete for allegiance (see section 3 on within-group dynamics—attractive-
ness). When there is a much better religious bargain available people can be expected to jump ship.
10. Institutional religions do not only compete with other institutional religions but also with secular institutions
that fulﬁll similar roles (e.g. welfare programs, secular schools). In fact, Hungerman (2011) found that religious
congregations in the US are more concerned with secular competition than with religious competition.
11. Food taboos negatively aﬀect an individual’s ability to interact with out-group members (Minkin, 1987; Rad-
cliﬀe-Brown, 1979).
12. Remember how rituals increase bonding and prosociality through synchrony.
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